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Cake day: June 3rd, 2024

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  • Many of these countries didn’t “gain” their independence from “Russia”, they were GRANTED independence by the Bolsheviks immediately after the November revolution. Really, look at Wikipedia’s article on the independence of Finland. The first constitution of the Russian Socialist Federation of Soviet Republics clearly specified the right to unilateral secession and independence for all nations of the former Russian Empire.

    Regardless of my or your opinions on the independence of these countries, you didn’t answer the question: what was the alternative to Soviet military occupation for the Baltics and Poland? Tell us, what was the realistic alternative?





  • Arguing that either China or Russia suck comparably as much as the US as current things stand is crazy. Most criticism of China is made-up anticommunist propaganda, criticism of Russia is often coated in russophobic tropes originating in Nazism and highly chauvinistic in nature (yes, Russia is on a downwards spiral of concerning fascist trends in government, but so is the entire west, literal Sieg Heil in US president inauguration and fascist parties in Germany and Austria).

    Westerners focusing their criticism on countries doing a fraction of the evil their own countries do is simple western exceptionalism and nationalism. Neither China nor Russia have anything in their recent history remotely comparable to the genocide in Gaza, the invasion of Iraq, the carpet bombing of Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and Korea, the history of coups and support of fascist regimes, and the history of colonialism of the west.


  • Lemmy.ml is a lemmy community primarily composed of socialists. Because socialists are highly critical of racist behaviour, white supremacist tropes, US exceptionalism/western chauvinism, imperialist attitudes (many of which bleed in well-meaning liberals), and capitalist countries, they don’t tolerate such things in their community and are very critical when they see such things in other communities, which is often met with distrust and dislike because nobody enjoys being confronted. .ml are very confrontational and they get met with confrontation. There are also some legit problems with a few moderators expressing transphobic beliefs, which is why i personally choose hexbear as my main community. Kinda sad that people here have such a red scare as if it were communists and not fascists in governments all over the western world right now and increasingly so.




  • It’s the cutting up other peoples countries part without their say

    Please tell me what alternative there was for these “cut up countries”. If the USSR hadn’t established military presence in these countries, they’d just have been invaded by the Nazis. Maybe you expect the Soviet Union, after being ignored for a decade of mutual defense negotiations, to selflessly send its people to die for the countries that refused a military alliance? Like literally, what was the alternative here











  • “ It is clear that Stalin had two courses open to him. He could seek a general coalition against Hitler, or he could come to an understanding with Hitler at the expense of the Western democracies. Stalin’s policy was guided by a profound conviction of the ultimate hostility of Nazi Germany, as well as by the hope that if the capitalist Powers became locked in mortal conflict, the Soviet Union might remain aloof, gaining strength while they tore one another to pieces. Certainly the principle of self-preservation lay at the heart of Moscow’s calculations ” Winston Churchill, The Gathering Storm, Chapter 20, The Soviet Enigma pub 1948.

    “ In those days the Soviet Government had grave reason to fear that they would be left one-on-one to face the Nazi fury. Stalin took measures which no free democracy could regard otherwise than with distaste. Yet I never doubted myself that his cardinal aim had been to hold the German armies off from Russia for as long as might be ” (Paraphrased from Churchill’s December 1944 remarks in the House of Commons.)

    “ It would be unwise to assume Stalin approves of Hitler’s aggression. Probably the Soviet Government has merely sought a delaying tactic, not wanting to be the next victim. They will have a rude awakening, but they think, at least for now, they can keep the wolf from the door ” Franklin D. Roosevelt (President of the United States, 1933–1945), from Harold L. Ickes’s diary entries, early September 1939. Ickes’s diaries are published as The Secret Diary of Harold Ickes.

    “ One must suppose that the Soviet Government, seeing no immediate prospect of real support from outside, decided to make its own arrangements for self‑defence, however unpalatable such an agreement might appear. We in this House cannot be astonished that a government acting solely on grounds of power politics should take that course ” Neville Chamberlain, House of Commons Statement, August 24, 1939 (one day after pact’s signing)

    “ We could not doubt that the Soviet Government, disillusioned by the hesitant negotiations with Britain and France, feared a lone struggle against Hitler’s mighty war machine. It seemed they had concluded, in the interests of survival, that an accord with Germany would at least postpone their day of reckoning ” Cordell Hull (U.S. Secretary of State), The Memoirs of Cordell Hull (Published 1948)

    “ *It must be said that the Soviet Government, having little confidence in swift military aid from the Western Powers, chose to protect its borders, however odious such a pact might seem. One perceives in their choice the determination to secure time—time they evidently believed we were not prepared to give them.” Édouard Daladier (French Prime Minister), Address to the French Chamber of Deputies, Late August 1939

    “ It seemed to me that the Soviet leaders believed conflict with Nazi Germany was inescapable. But, lacking clear assurances of military partnership from England and France, they resolved that a ‘breathing spell’ was urgently needed. In that sense, the pact with Germany was a temporary expedient to keep the wolf from the door ” Joseph E. Davies (U.S. Ambassador to the USSR, 1937–1938), Mission to Moscow (1941)

    “ British officials, for all their outrage, concede that Stalin, with no firm pledge of Allied assistance, and regarding Poland as a foregone victim, decided that if the Red Army must eventually face Hitler, it should not be without first gaining some strategic space—and time ” Joseph P. Kennedy (U.S. Ambassador to the UK, 1938–1940),Private Correspondence, September 1939

    Hopefully, you won’t accuse such sources, i.e. western diplomats and politicians who actually experienced WW2, of being tankies


  • “ It is clear that Stalin had two courses open to him. He could seek a general coalition against Hitler, or he could come to an understanding with Hitler at the expense of the Western democracies. Stalin’s policy was guided by a profound conviction of the ultimate hostility of Nazi Germany, as well as by the hope that if the capitalist Powers became locked in mortal conflict, the Soviet Union might remain aloof, gaining strength while they tore one another to pieces. Certainly the principle of self-preservation lay at the heart of Moscow’s calculations ” Winston Churchill, The Gathering Storm, Chapter 20, The Soviet Enigma pub 1948.

    “ In those days the Soviet Government had grave reason to fear that they would be left one-on-one to face the Nazi fury. Stalin took measures which no free democracy could regard otherwise than with distaste. Yet I never doubted myself that his cardinal aim had been to hold the German armies off from Russia for as long as might be ” (Paraphrased from Churchill’s December 1944 remarks in the House of Commons.)

    “ It would be unwise to assume Stalin approves of Hitler’s aggression. Probably the Soviet Government has merely sought a delaying tactic, not wanting to be the next victim. They will have a rude awakening, but they think, at least for now, they can keep the wolf from the door ” Franklin D. Roosevelt (President of the United States, 1933–1945), from Harold L. Ickes’s diary entries, early September 1939. Ickes’s diaries are published as The Secret Diary of Harold Ickes.

    “ One must suppose that the Soviet Government, seeing no immediate prospect of real support from outside, decided to make its own arrangements for self‑defence, however unpalatable such an agreement might appear. We in this House cannot be astonished that a government acting solely on grounds of power politics should take that course ” Neville Chamberlain, House of Commons Statement, August 24, 1939 (one day after pact’s signing)

    “ We could not doubt that the Soviet Government, disillusioned by the hesitant negotiations with Britain and France, feared a lone struggle against Hitler’s mighty war machine. It seemed they had concluded, in the interests of survival, that an accord with Germany would at least postpone their day of reckoning ” Cordell Hull (U.S. Secretary of State), The Memoirs of Cordell Hull (Published 1948)

    “ *It must be said that the Soviet Government, having little confidence in swift military aid from the Western Powers, chose to protect its borders, however odious such a pact might seem. One perceives in their choice the determination to secure time—time they evidently believed we were not prepared to give them.” Édouard Daladier (French Prime Minister), Address to the French Chamber of Deputies, Late August 1939

    “ It seemed to me that the Soviet leaders believed conflict with Nazi Germany was inescapable. But, lacking clear assurances of military partnership from England and France, they resolved that a ‘breathing spell’ was urgently needed. In that sense, the pact with Germany was a temporary expedient to keep the wolf from the door ” Joseph E. Davies (U.S. Ambassador to the USSR, 1937–1938), Mission to Moscow (1941)

    “ British officials, for all their outrage, concede that Stalin, with no firm pledge of Allied assistance, and regarding Poland as a foregone victim, decided that if the Red Army must eventually face Hitler, it should not be without first gaining some strategic space—and time ” Joseph P. Kennedy (U.S. Ambassador to the UK, 1938–1940),Private Correspondence, September 1939

    Hopefully, you won’t accuse such sources, i.e. western diplomats and politicians who actually experienced WW2, of being tankies